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LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Manley O. Hudson
In his introduction to the latest Blue
Book published by the Naval War
Collcge, Admiral Spruance quoted what
he termed "a prophetic utterance"
made in 1889 by William Edward Hall.
Hall's treatise on International Law was
a standard exposition of the British
point of view over a whole generation.
This was his statement which was
quoted by Admiral Spruance:
It is a matter of experience that
times, in which international law
has been scriously disregarded,
have been followed by periods in
which the European eonseience
has done penance by putting itself
under straiter obligations than
those which it had before
acknowledged. There is no
necessity to suppose that things
will be otherwise in the future. I
therefore look forward with much
misgiving to the manner in which
the next great war will be waged,
but with no misgiving at all as to
the character of the rules which
will be acknowledged ten years
after its termination, by
comparison with the rules now
considered to exist
We live today in a deeade following a
great war. I wish I might tell you that
because of the penance which the
world's conscience has suffered, great
changes are in progress such as Hall
foresaw. I would find it difficult to

make such a statement, however, and
perhaps we shall be on safer ground if
we confine our attention today to the
international law which has grown up in
the past, even though in some respects it
has been seriously disregarded in recent
years.
Our system of international law has
been developed over a period of more
than three centuries. It is distinctly
Western and European in origin. In
tracing its growth, we usually refer to
the Spanish jurist-theologians of the
sixteenth century, but we ascribe first
place to Hugo Grotius whose great book
on "The Law of War and Peace" was
first published in 1625. For a long
period, international law was conceived
to be not only European, but also
Christian, and its application was
limited to Christian States. In the course
of the nineteenth century, however, we
broke ourselves free from such limitations, and in the words of the World
Court the principles of international law
"are in force between all independent
nations" and "apply equally" to all of
them.
Fundamental in our thinking on international law is the conception of a
community of States. All States are
necessarily members of this community.
There is no room in the modern world
for a hermit State living outside of the
community-even Nepal has recently
come to a realization of this fact, and
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has brought itself into relations with
other States.
If you ask me the number of States
forming this international community, I
cannot give a simple answer and I think
you and I might have some differences
of OpInIOn. There are fifty-eight
"States" which are members of the
United Nations-at least they are all
called "States" in the Charter, though
some of them do not deserve the compliment. A considerable number of
States are not members of the United
Nations. If we attempted to list them,
we should probably be able to agree on
fifteen; but we might run into differences of opinion concerning an additional eight or ten, for the status of
some political communities is always in
doubt. New States have come upon the
horizon, and some of those we listed a
decade ago have disappeared.
We start basically, then, with the fact
that some seventy-five or eighty States
exist in the world-they are more interdependent than independent-and with
the conception that these States form a
community. This community must have
a law to regulate the relations of its
members. That is the fundamental fact
underlying international law_
This community has suffered greatly
in the past from lack of organization. In
the early part of the last century, what
was known as the Concert of Europe
assumed a general direction of European
affairs in times of crisis; but organization for regulating ordinary peace-time
relations was wholly lacking. Soon after
the middle of the century, as the
progress of inventions began to draw
peoples nearer together, we began to get
some permanent organizations. An
International Telegraphic Union,
formed in 1865, still exists as the
International Telecommunications
Union; and the Universal Postal Union,
formed in 1874, is still functioning
smoothly.
Such successes led quite naturally to
attempts to form international organiza-
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tion of a more general character. The
series of Peace Conferences held at The
Hauge in 1899 and 1907-the Conference projected for 1914 never metrepresented a feeble effort in this direction. Far more ambitious was the
League of Nations which began to function in 1920. In the course of twenty
years, it laid many useful foundations.
Looking back on the period, its failures
can easily be exaggerated-in some part
they were due to the abstention of our
own country. Yet the successes were
notable, and they paved the way for a
new effort to be undertaken when a
disastrous World War had intervened.
The United Nations follows in the
footsteps of the League of Nations.
Indeed, its Charter is in a sense a revised
version of the Covenant. I am not
disposed to overstate the prospect
created by such a world organization. It
still lacks universality. It is crippled by
limitations, some of them formalized in
its Charter, some of them due to
divisions among peoples which the
Charter cannot erase. Of course failures
are to be expected-that is true also of
the Government of the United States,
though it is one of the most stable and
successful governments in the world.
Yet failure does not always denote the
unwisdom of initial effort, and if the
United Nations can be kept functioning
its successes may far outbalance its
failures. A prospect exists, therefore, for
a greatly strengthened international law
to serve the interests of a community of
States, more integrated than it has ever
been in the past.
I think one can safely speak today of
a growing body of constitutional international law. Even since 1945, great
progress has been made in this direction.
The Charter of the United Nations is
more than an ordinary international
treaty. Some of its provisions expressly
envisage States which are not parties to
it. And under the Charter a number of
specialized agencies have been brought
into relations with the overall Organiza-
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tion- a feat which was never achieved
by the League of Nations despite the
anticipation put down in Article 24 of
the Covenant
One can also speak today of a great
volume of international legislation
whieh orders our international intercourse. It is true that we do not have an
international parliament exercising legislative functions analogous to those of
the Congress of the United States or of
the Parliament at Westminster. Yet it
would be a mistake to draw from this
fact the deduction that we have no
legislation operating across national
frontiers. Over almost a hundred years,
a clear-cut legislative process has been
developed; after preparations which are
frequently very protracted, representatives of many States assemble in an
international conference, and they often
succeed in reaching agreement on legislative texts which later become operative in consequence of their ratification.
International legislation is like national
legislation in that there is no requirement that it be universally applicable, or
that it should bind those who do not
assent to it.
Thanks to this international legislative process, we have today a great
volume of world law, some of it
accumulated over a period of many
years. Unfortunately, it is little known.
Even writers on international law often
ignore it, so that we cannot be too
severe in our reproof of those lay
writers and speakers who advocate the
creation of a vague "world law" without
taking account of what we have already.
In a series of fat volumes entitled
"International Legislation," I have
attempted to collect the legislative texts
of the past thirty years; these volumes
are in the Library of the Naval War
College, and if you will glance at them I
think you will be impressed with the
extent of the achievement.
During the past hundred years,
progress can also be noted in the field of
international adjudication. Here, too,

we have suffered from lack of organization in the past. Yet in the course of a
century, scored of ad hoc international
tribunals have been created for the
judicial application of international law,
and with but few exceptions they have
functioned with remarkable success.
The fact inspired a robust movement for
creating a permanent tribunal to which
States might take their differences for
adjudication according to law. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, created in
1899, as a consequence of this movement, was indeed a feeble step; yet for a
quarter of a century, it yielded some
results. If it is now somewhat moribund,
it still exists with the support of more
than forty States. The Central American
Court of Justice, created under a Convention of 1907, had a checkered career
and expired at the end of a decade.
A more important step for strengthening international law was taken in
1920 when the Permanent Court of
International Justice was created. For
almost twenty years before the recent
war, it functioned actively to the general satisfaction of the world. As I was
for ten years a judge of this Court, it
was a happy day for me when the
Conference at San Francisco decided to
take the Court over as an organ of the
United Nations, and to annex its
Statute, slightly refurbished, to the
Charter. It was rechristened the International Court of Justice, but the chain of
continuity was not broken. This Court
is now in session at The Hague, dealing
with the Corfu Channel Case between
the United Kingdom and Albania-a
case of great interest to naval officers. I
am now engaged in writing the story of
its activities during its twenty-seventh
year.
I do not minimize the difficulty of
persuading States to confer on the
World Court jurisdiction over their legal
disputes. In 1945, as in 1920, a determined effort was made to write into its
Statute provisions which would have
invested the Court with what we call
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"compulsory jurisdiction "-i.e., jurisdiction independent of States' consent
given at the time. While that effort
failed, provisions were adopted to enable States desiring to do so to confer
such jurisdiction on the Court as between themselves, and thirty-two States
are now bound by declarations which
have this effect. It is to me a matter for
regret that the declaration made by the
United States in 1946 was narrowed by
two frustrating reservations, one of
which would disable the Court from
exercising jurisdiction over a dispute to
which the United States is a party if the
United States declares the dispute to
relate to a domestic matter. Fortunately, this American example has not
been followed by many other States.
Despite such difficulties one can only
conclude that very considerable progress
has been made in this matter.
More encouraging, perhaps, is the fact
that general agreement now exists in the
world on the basic features of international adjudication. Opinion is unanimous as to the nature of the judicial
function, and as to the essential elements
of the procedure to be followed. Nor is
there disagreement concerning the obligation of States to comply with a judgment of an international tribunal. As a
matter of history, the record of such
compliance over the years is quite remarkable. If there have been a few cases
in which losing States have refused to
carry out international judgments, they
are the exception and not the rule. Not
once has any State defied the World
Court by declining to abide by its judgment declaring the applicable law.
I have spoken of the growth of a
constitutional international law for the
community of States, of the development of a fecund process of international legislation, and of the reassuring
record of international tribunals. Let me
now say a word concerning the vast
number of bipartite treaties by which
States have sought to regulate their
conduct.

I suspect that most of us do not
appreciate the number of treaties in
force in the world at any given time.
Some twenty years ago, a colleague of
mine estimated that not less than fifteen
thousand treaties were then in force. I
believe his estimate today would go
beyond that figure, though the precise
status of some treaties may be in doubt.
The Department of State is now issuing
an excellent publication entitled United
States Treaties and Other International
Acts Series. If you will leaf through the
recent numbers of that Series, I think
you may be surprised at the extent of
your American treaty law. Such bipartite treaties are followed and applied
in every-day life as a matter of course.
Rarely, in time of peace at any rate,
does any State refuse to meet its treaty
obligations as it understands them to be.
No country wishes to have the reputation of violating its pledged word.
Two facts are outstanding from this
review: first, that judgments of international tribunals are as a rule always
complied with; and second, that treaty
obligations are habitually met.
There remains another field in which
international law has been and continues to be developed-the field of
customary law. When over a considerable period of time we find that a
number of States have followed a course
of action in the belief that they were
acting in accordance with what the law
ordains, we can say that a customary
rule of law has come into being. Such a
situation must be appreciated, of
course, and the appreciation must be
made by men trained in legal technique.
I do not wish to exaggerate the extent
to which existing international law is
based on practice evidencing custom,
but within limits this must be recognized as one of the ways by which law
accumulates.
Perhaps, I should illustrate this point.
Over a course of many years, numerous
States asserted jurisdiction over a part
of the seas bathing their coasts;

61
gradually, the range of cannon-shot was
taken as the limit of such jurisdiction,
and in the nineteenth century this range
came to be measured in terms of leagues
or miles. The States of the world are not
agreed on the number of miles-some
take three, some take more; but there is
now a rule of customary law that the
marginal sea forms part of the territory
of a littoral State, subject only to the
innocent passage of the vessels-at
least the merchant vessels-of other
States.
What I have said may be summarized
in a statement concerning the sources of
International Law. Basing myself on
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, I must put first
"international conventions, whether
general or particular, establishing rules
recognized by the States concerned."
Then a second source is "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law"; these are the words of
the Statute, but I should prefer to say
"international practice, as evidence of a
general custom accepted as law." Then
the Statute lists "the general principles
of law recognized by civilized nations"-this seems to mean that the
Court may apply principles of national
law; as all nations are "civilized, "
though not in one mould, perhaps the
limitation in the Statute is a bit invidious.
Fourth and fifth sources are put
down in the Statute as "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most
highly qualified publicists of the various
nations"; hut these are referred to as
only "suhsidiary means for the determination of rules of law." International
judicial decisions do not narrow down
from precedent to precedent as do the
decisions of national courts in our common law. A case seldom involves a

situation precisely analogous to that of
a previous case, and precedent plays less
of a role in international adjudications
than in the work of national courts.
As to the teachings of puhlicists, I
would suggest that one must he on his
guard. Few are writers whose works can
he used without careful attention to
their nationality, the date and place of
their writing, and the circumstances
which inspired it. Writers, even dead
ones, seldom deserve the compliment
paid in calling them "authorities." In
this country, the treatise puhlished hy
Wheaton a century ago is outstandingit has gone through many editions, and
has heen widely puhlished in translations-and yet I should hesitate to consider it authoritative.
If you wish to have at hand a useful
readahle treatise which is not too hulky
for following the development of international law, I can suggest two such
small volumes to you: "The Law of
Nations," hy my Oxford colleague Professor J.L. Brierly-now in its third
edition; and "International Law" hy my
friend Charles G. Fenwick, of the Pan
American Union-also now in its third
edition. I can also suggest two periodicals which you may wish to have at
hand: the weekly Bulletin of the Department of State, and the quarterly
American Journal of International Law,
over the past forty-two years.
My lecture today is of an introductory character. I have sought to give you
only a general account of the legal
foundations of international relations,
without going into the suhstantive content of our existing law. In our future
work we shall have occasion to muster
some of its precepts and principles, and
to relate them to the concrete situations
with which a naval officer is frequently
faced.

----'fi----

